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Abstract 
It is widely believed that globalization, through increased factor mobility, will exert a 
downward pressure on tax rates and hence on public expenditures. Recent advances in 
the new economic geography (NEG) literature have, however, shown that such a ‘race 
to the bottom’ is not inevitable. Even with perfect factor mobility, a positive tax 
differential between core and peripheral countries can persist as long as the 
agglomeration rent, that is associated with being located in the agglomeration, 
exceeds the tax gap. In these NEG models the relevance of government spending as a 
determinant of agglomeration is, however, unduly neglected. The focus is on tax rates 
only and on the stability of core-periphery equilibria. Using a NEG model where the 
provision of public goods is allowed to influence the location choices of economic 
agents and starting intially from a spreading instead of a core-periphery equilibrium, 
we show that governments can affect the spatial equilibrium through their provision 
of public goods. Our main finding is that the introduction of public goods fosters 
agglomeration in the sense that it makes the spreading equilibrium unstable.  
 
JEL Code: H10, F12, F15 
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1. Introduction 
Tax harmonization is high on the political agenda of the EU-countries. It is widely 
believed that with the arrival of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and with 
“globalization” in general the EU-countries are forced to harmonize taxes. The 
standard reasoning is that in the absence of a policy of tax harmonization full-fledged 
economic integration in the EU will lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. For the EU, Sinn 
(1990) has aptly summarized this line of reasoning. A race to the bottom would mean 
that in a truly common market in the EU, the mobile factors of production (in 
particular high-skilled labor and capital) will locate in the country with the lowest tax 
rate, with the result that all EU-countries are forced to adopt this tax rate. In other 
words, economic integration could go along with fierce tax competition between the 
EU-countries. This is thought to be harmful because it would imply a sub-optimal 
provision of public goods. To avoid this unwanted outcome, a policy of tax 
harmonization is deemed necessary. However, taxes are only part of the story:  
location specific government expenditures, which affect the quality of a country's 
social and economic infrastructure, also determine the attractiveness of a location. 
 
The recent new economic geography literature leads potentially to very different 
conclusions with respect to tax competition and harmonization (Baldwin et al, 2003). 
In a much-debated paper, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) show that there is no need for 
a race to the bottom to begin with and that a policy of tax harmonization could make 
all countries worse off. The main idea is that economic integration could lead to a 
core-periphery outcome, with an agglomeration rent for the production factors 
located in the core, reflecting the fact that the production factors earn more (in real 
terms) in the core than in the periphery. The rent can be taxed and this allows the core 
countries to have a higher tax rate than the peripheral countries (see also Andersson 
and Forslid, 2003). Tax competition thus does not need to lead to a race to the bottom, 
which is important because it corresponds with the observed lack of a race to the 
bottom in reality.  
 
Although the contributions of Baldwin and Krugman (2004), and Andersson and 
Forslid (2003) challenge the standard views about the race to the bottom, their 
treatment of the government sector is rather rudimentary, emphasizing taxes and not 
the productive effects of public expenditures on the economy which is also used as a 
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policy instrument in order to increase the attractiveness of a region.1 Furthermore, 
these studies concentrate on the agglomeration equilibrium and analyze the 
relationship between the agglomeration rent and the tax gap between core and 
periphery. In doing so, the focus is on the conditions under which the agglomeration 
equilibrium is stable (that is to say, the sustain (and not the break) analysis in NEG 
terminology is central).    
 
Public regional expenditure, however, is potentially very important. During the 
European Council meeting of the EU in Lisbon in March 2000, for example, the EU 
member states agreed upon a (benchmarking) method to determine the 
competitiveness of the EU economies using no less than 54 indicators, with emphasis 
on the quality of the social and economic infrastructure. Keen and Marchand (1997) 
use a simpler model in which agglomeration economies play no role and explore a 
government’s choice of type of public expenditures (public input to production versus 
public consumption good) and show that similar incentives as discussed below lead to 
a bias in favor of public inputs. Similarly, Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004) show that 
(biased) public expenditures can influence a country’s specialization pattern.  
 
When the effects of agglomeration are thought to be important, tax and spending 
policies represent two opposing forces. All other things remaining the same, higher 
taxes stimulate spreading even though the existence of an agglomeration rent may 
prevent the spreading from actually taking place. Similarly, an increase in public 
spending stimulates agglomeration if this spending enhances the attractiveness of the 
location for the mobile factors of production.2 But all things do not remain the same in 
the sense that higher taxes typically also imply higher public spending and vice versa. 
The extent to which a larger government sector (meaning higher public spending and 
taxes) really leads to a better quality of the country's infrastructure is an issue that has 
troubled EU policy-makers for a long time.  
 
In this paper we extend the Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Andersson and Forslid 
(2003) approach in three ways. First, we allow for public spending to affect the cost 
of production, which has an impact on the location decisions of firms and workers. 
Second, we also take into account that the public sector competes with the private 
sector on the labor market so that public spending takes up net resources. Third, in our 
 4
analysis we focus on the symmetric equilibrium, as opposed to the core-periphery or 
agglomeration equilibrium (as in Baldwin and Krugman, 2004), and thereby on the 
impact of the provision of public goods on the symmetric equilibrium. The present 
paper focuses on the interdependencies between taxes and government spending from 
a production cost perspective, see Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk (2002) for 
a discussion of the relation between government spending and consumption 
externalities. At this stage, it is important to note what we do not do. We do not 
analyze locational competition in which optimizing governments compete – often in a 
Nash setting – for mobile factors of production. This would require a discussion of 
what it is that governments optimize and in what type of game they are involved (co-
operative or non-cooperative). These important issues require a separate paper.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents some stylized facts for 
the EU about cross-country differences in corporate rate income taxation, public 
spending, location indicators and the corresponding differences in location decisions. 
Section 3 presents the 2-region new economic geography model, the so called Forslid-
Ottaviano model with the addition of a more elaborate government sector. In section 4  
we analyze the impact of the (symmetric) introduction of public goods on the key 
variables in our model. Section 5 conducts a break analysis. That is to say, for a given 
level of public goods we analyze when the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable. 
The outcome is also compared with the benchmark of no public goods provision. In 
section 6 we present some simulations to illustrate how the introduction of public 
goods may affect the equilibrium distribution of the footloose factor of production 
(capital) between the 2 countries.  Section 7 summarizes and concludes. Our main 
finding is that the introduction of our version of public goods fosters agglomeration. 
 
2. Stylized facts about taxation and public spending in the EU 
We first illustrate that a race to the bottom in the EU is not inevitable. We concentrate 
on the taxation of capital because in our model we assume that capital is mobile and 
labor is not. This is in accordance with the often-observed higher degree of capital  
 
Table 1 Placed here 
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mobility as compared to labor mobility. For the EU countries, Table 1 shows the 
development of corporate income taxes for the period 1990-1999, an era of increasing 
economic integration. These tax rates differ from the “nominal” tax rates as they take 
into account the implications of differences in tax base, allowances for depreciation, 
etc. that exist between EU-countries. The reported data are based on financial 
accounts of individual firms. 
 
Table 1 offers no conclusive evidence, but a number of things are worth pointing out: 
 The large countries of the EU (Germany, the UK, France and Italy) clearly have 
an above-average tax rate.3 
 The smaller and “peripheral” countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) started out 
with a below-average tax rate, but their corporate income tax rates clearly 
increased during the 1990s. Ireland is a notable exception. 
 The average EU corporate income tax rate is fairly constant through time, in any 
case shows no discernible downward trend. 
 The standard deviation has strongly decreased from 1990 to 1999, so there is some 
tax rate convergence, but not towards the lowest rate 
 
These four observations offer some (preliminary) support for the lack of a race to the 
bottom. Core/large countries persistently have higher tax rates and small/peripheral 
countries even display some “catching up” in terms of their tax rates.4 Measuring the 
effective corporate income tax burden for firms is, however, not an easy task and the 
findings shown in Table 1 are not undisputed. It is clear that for almost every OECD 
country statutory income tax rates have come down from the 1980s onwards. With 
respect to effective tax rates, the seminal study by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm 
(2002) concludes that effective marginal rates have remained rather stable whereas 
effective average tax rates have come down. Even if corporate income tax rates have 
decreased, the tax base has invariably been broadened with the result that for most 
countries tax revenues on corporate income as a percentage of GDP have been more 
or less stable since 1965 (Devereux et al, 2002, p. 487). Be that as it may, these 
findings are in line with those in Table 1 to the extent that they are both at odds with 
the predictions that follow from the standard tax competition literature and pose 
questions as to the relevance of the race to the bottom hypothesis.5 In related 
empirical work, and taking the NEG literature into account, Krogstrup (2004) and 
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Garretsen and Peeters (2006) find that capital mobility puts (at most) a limited 
downward pressure on corporate tax rates but also that core or more centrally located 
countries typically have a higher corporate tax rate.      
 
Table 2 Placed here 
 
Next, we turn to government spending, see Table 2. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) 
explain the lack of a race to the bottom for taxation in the EU by the fact that despite 
higher tax rates, the after tax income in the core EU countries is still larger than in the 
more peripheral EU countries due to a positive agglomeration rent.  These rents are 
the result of positive pecuniary externalities. By looking only at taxation, government 
policy either has no impact at all on the location of economic activity as long as the 
tax rate is not too high or, if the tax rate exceeds a specific threshold, the 
agglomeration equilibrium can no longer be sustained. A core country can thus afford 
a higher tax rate, but in essence taxation is a potential spreading force. Government 
policies then, in principle, do not contribute to the agglomeration forces. However, we 
stress that public spending is an essential part of the story and that government 
policies can increase the attractiveness of a country.6  
 
Table 2 illustrates that, with respect to government spending, the EU-countries are not 
involved in a race to the bottom. It shows that for most EU countries there is no 
downward trend in (central) government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. This is 
certainly true for the core EU-countries: Germany, France and the UK. Furthermore, 
in some of the peripheral EU-countries there is an increase in this expenditure ratio. 
Again, there are marked cross-country differences, but there is no evidence of a race 
to the bottom.  
 
Table 3 Placed here 
 
Benchmarking has been a popular method recently among EU-policymakers to 
compare the relative location advantages of the EU-countries and regions for the 
mobile factors of production. If we take North-West Europe as an example, the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs has identified the regions in Table 3 as having the most 
attractive location characteristics. The table indicates that the attractiveness is to some 
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extent thought to be the result of (past) regional public spending. The table lists just a 
few reasons why some regions are preferred locations, but it does suggest that 
location decisions can be affected by regional government spending on, for example, 
infra-structure and not only by the levels of taxation. This last point also comes across 
from an UNCTAD survey on location and foreign direct investment (UNCTAD, 
1996). Large companies like Samsung or Daimler-Chrysler stated that, apart from 
taxes and subsidies, the social and economic infrastructure (transports) are key 
determinants for their location decisions. To show this point formally we now turn to 
the model. 
 
3. The Model 
We extend the analytically solvable model developed by Forslid (1999), Ottaviano 
(2001), and Forslid and Ottaviano (2001, 2003), henceforth referred to as the Forslid-
Ottaviano model, by including a more detailed analysis of the government sector, 
incorporating government spending effects, the efficiency of government production, 
and competition between the government and the private sector on the labor market. 
The reason to use this analytically solvable model is twofold. First, in the discussion 
of tax competition the main issue is that mobile and immobile factors of production 
react differently to taxation. Below we will call the immobile factor labor and the 
mobile factor capital. In the European context this corresponds to the fact that labor is 
less mobile than capital. As argued by Ottaviano (2001) it is realistic to assume that 
the manufacturing or modern sector uses both skilled and unskilled labor to produce 
its output.7 The ability to distinguish between mobile and immobile factors in the 
manufacturing sector is also why Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Andersson and 
Forslid (2003) take this model as the starting point in their analyses of tax competition 
and economic integration. A second reason to use the model is that it can be solved 
analytically, which enables us to derive some analytical results.  
 
There are two regions (j=1,2). Each region has jL  workers and jK  capital.
8 Capital 
can be thought of as human or knowledge capital. Workers are geographically 
immobile, whereas capital is mobile. Henceforth we make the following assumption: 
 The two regions are identical with respect to the immobile factor of production, 
that is 5.021 == LL .  
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All agents have the same preferences, depending on the consumption of food F and 
manufactures M, a composite of n different varieties ci: 
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where δ  is the share of income spent on manufactures and σ is the elasticity of 
substitution between different varieties of manufactures. The production of food, 
which is freely traded at zero transport costs, takes place under constant returns to 
scale and requires only workers. A suitable choice of units ensures that one unit of 
labor produces one unit of food. Labor is used in food production and in the variable 
cost part of production in the manufacturing sector. Using food as a numéraire and 
assuming free trade implies that its price, and hence the wage rate, can be set equal to 
one. This means that we only have to determine the return to capital, r.  
 
Firms in the manufacturing industry use labor and capital to produce a variety of 
manufactures under increasing returns to scale. The fixed cost component represents 
the knowledge-intensive part of the manufacturing production process, such as R&D, 
marketing and management. Both the fixed and variable cost components of 
production depend upon the quality of the infrastructure, education level, judicial 
system, police services, etc. All of these are related to the level of government 
spending jZ . The reduction in costs is measured by the efficiency function )( jj Zf  
with 0',1)0( ≤= jj ff . This distinguishes our model from Andersson and Forslid 
(2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004). Let jr  be the return to capital in region j, 
then the costs of producing x  units of a manufacturing variety in region j are equal to 
(the choice of units, and the fact that the wage rate equals unity simplifies the notation 
below): 
(3) [ ]xrZf jjj ]/)1[()( σσ −+   
 
The production of public goods requires capital only under constant returns to scale. 
This is the second extension of our model: we assume that the production of public 
goods takes up net resources. It captures the idea that government production 
competes with private production and relates to the discussion about the optimal size 
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of the government sector. Market clearing for capital in region j allows us to 
determine the number of varieties produced in region j : 
(4) )(/)( jjjjj ZfZKn −=  
Note, that this equation differs from the standard equation in the NEG-literature that 
determines the number of varieties in the sense that the “fixed” costs are no-longer 
fixed in our variant of the model. Equation (4) reflects the fact that the private and 
public sector compete with each other on the labor market. Equilibrium in the public 
sector requires that the value of public spending is fully paid by taxes:  
(5) jjjj YtZr = ,  
where jt  is the uniform income tax rate that applies to both labor and capital.
9 Given 
the sector distribution of capital and the return to capital, choosing a level of public 
goods determines the tax rate and vice versa. In addition we assume that capital 
employed in the public sector earns the same return as in the private sector. This 
reflects the notion that the public sector has to pay competing wages in order to attract 
capital. 
 
Standard monopolistic competition mark-up pricing gives:  
(6) )( jjj Zfp =  
This pricing rule applies for locally produced and sold goods. Two observations with 
respect to this rule can be made. First, due to the production structure – see equation 
(3) - the price pj does not depend on wages. Second, we cannot choose units such that 
1=jp  because the marginal cost of production are a function of the level of public 
goods jZ  provided in region j. However, once we know the level of public goods 
provided, the local price level for manufacturing varieties is also determined. 
 
Free entry and exit in the manufacturing sector ensures that profits are zero, which 
determines the equilibrium output per firm, see (7). Using our normalization of 
wages, the income in region j is given in (8). 
(7) jj rx σ=  
(8) jjjj LKrY +=  
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Using Samuelson’s (1952) iceberg transport costs T (= the number of goods shipped 
from a region to ensure that 1 unit arrives in the other region) in the manufacturing 
sector, the price charged in the other region is T times as high as the mill price. It is 
convenient to define the ‘free-ness of trade’ parameter φ  as a function of transport 
costs and the elasticity of substitution: σφ −≡ 1T . It ranges between 0 and 1, where 
0=φ  represents autarky and 1=φ  indicates free trade (no obstacles to the movement 
of manufacturing varieties of any kind whatsoever).  
 
The manufacturing sector market clearing condition is standard and given by (note 
that we assume that civil servants have the same preferences as non-civil servants, so 
that the income term reflects total income) 
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where jP  is the price index for manufactures in region j. The left-hand side of 
equation (9) gives the equilibrium (value of) output per firm and the right-hand side 
the associated demand coming from the home region, and from the distant region, 
which explains the transport cost term. Using equations (6), (7), (9), and (10) gives: 
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In the sequel we let λ  denote the share of capital in region 1. As shown in Appendix 
I, the ratio of the rewards to capital is equal to: 
(12) σσψλδφψφψφσ
δλφψφψφσ −−≡−++++
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Once the functional form of the provision of public goods, see equation (3), is 
specified, in addition to a public policy rule determining the level of public goods, 
equation (12) can be explicitly written as a function of λ , the share of capital in 
region 1. 
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To round up the discussion of our model, we note that the location decision of capital 
involves not only the factor rewards r1 and r2 but also the respective price levels, tax 
rates, and the provision of public services. The incentive of capital to re-locate is 
therefore determined by the ratio ρ of indirect utilities (or welfare): 
(13) 
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This ratio is central in the analysis in the next sections. Apart from the case of 
complete agglomeration, capital has no incentive to re-locate if welfare is the same in 
the two regions ( 1=ρ ), while capital moves from region 2 to region 1 if welfare is 
higher in region 1 ( 1>ρ ) and from region 1 to region 2 if welfare is lower in region 1 
( 1<ρ ). This completes our discussion of the model. 
 
4. Analysis  of the symmetric equilibrium for a given level of public goods 
Extending the Forslid-Ottaviano model, in which the manufacturing sector uses both a 
mobile and an immobile production factor, not only allows us to analyze and illustrate 
locational competition, but also enables us to derive some analytical results. In doing 
so, we focus attention on the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium, that is if both 
regions provide the same level of public goods and attract the same share of capital. 
This is another difference with for instance Baldwin and Krugman (2004) who build 
their analysis on the case of the agglomeration equilibrium, the case where all 
footloose economic activity is located in one country. Here, we ask a different 
question: what happens to the stability of the symmetric or no-agglomeration 
equilibrium once we allow for public goods? In particular, we want to know if 
agglomeration becomes more likely or not, see section 5. 
 
Assumption 1  
 The two regions have a constant and given level of public goods ZZZ == 21 . 
 The influence of government spending on the cost of production in the two 
regions are identical: fff == 21 . 
 
Proposition 1 (spreading). Under assumption 1, the impact of public goods on the 
symmetric equilibrium is summarized in Table 4 (see appendix II). 
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Table 4 Placed here 
 
 
The impact of the standard new economic geography parameters on the spreading 
equilibrium is not surprising: an increase in the free-ness of trade parameter has no 
direct effect on most variables as measured relative to the numéraire, but of course 
reduces the price index (as more manufactured goods arrive at their destination) and 
thus increases real income and the real return to capital (and labor). As the free-ness 
of trade increases beyond a certain level the symmetric equilibrium will become 
unstable, see also below. An increase in the elasticity of substitution increases 
competition between varieties, which therefore reduces the return to capital and thus 
income. In addition, an increase in the ease with which consumers can substitute 
between different varieties reduces the price index.10 An increase in the share of 
income spent on manufactures increases the importance of capital relative to labor and 
thus increases the return to capital and income.  
 
Increasing the provision of public goods reduces the cost of production (and thus the 
price) of an individual variety, and (through the increased scarcity of capital) 
increases the return to capital and income. All of this comes at the costs of an 
increased tax rate because the government has to pay competitive returns to capital. 
Since the share of capital allocated to the production of manufactures decreases while 
at the same time the “waste” in terms of the fixed cost to produce varieties decreases, 
the net effect on the number of varieties produced and on the price index is unclear. 
Enlarging the government sector is therefore a mixed blessing, the wisdom of which 
depends on the particular circumstances. If the production of public goods has a large 
enough impact on reducing the costs of production, the improved efficiency of the 
economy is beneficial through a reduction in the price of a variety and the price index 
and through an increase in the number of varieties produced (love-of-variety effect, 
see Brakman, Garretsen, and Van Marrewijk (2001, ch. 7)).  
 
Note that under assumption 1 the terms jψ  defined in equation (12) are equal to 1, 
which therefore simplifies to:  
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The function )(2 Zh λ  is defined for future reference.11 As the notation clarifies, the 
return to capital is a function of the share λ of capital located in region 1, given the 
level of public goods Z  produced in each region. The direction of the impact of the 
provision of public goods on the ratio of rewards to capital is readily determined. And 
gives us proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2 (magnification I). If, for a given distribution of capital under 
assumption 1, region 1 has a higher reward to capital than region 2 in the absence of 
public goods, an equal provision of public goods in both regions magnifies the 
relatively higher reward to capital in region 1. 
 
Similarly, using the above conditions, the relative price index 12 / PP  simplifies to: 
(14) 
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Again, the direction of the impact of the provision of public goods on the relative 
price ratio can be readily determined.  
 
Proposition 3 (magnification II). If, for a given distribution of capital under 
assumption 1, region 2 has a higher price index than region 1 in the absence of public 
goods, an equal provision of public goods in both regions magnifies the relatively 
higher price index of region 2. 
 
Obviously, if a higher return to capital in a particular region (for instance r1>r2) is 
also associated with a higher price index in that region (P1>P2), the combination of 
propositions 2 and 3 shows that the net effect on the real rate of return to capital of the 
introduction of public goods depends on the relative magnitude of the impact on the 
rate of return compared to the impact on the price index. In the core geographical 
economics model upon which the Forslid-Ottaviano model is based, it is typically true 
that the region with a larger share of the mobile factor of production (say, region 1) 
would have a higher return to capital (r1>r2) as well as a lower price index (P1<P2) in 
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which case the introduction of public goods would unambiguously foster 
agglomeration.  
 
5. Break analysis for a given level of public goods 
Based on the propositions derived in the previous section and our simulation results 
below, the introduction of productive public goods increases the possibilities for 
active government intervention by fostering agglomeration of manufacturing 
production rather than spreading of manufacturing production. This section formally 
addresses this question by analyzing the stability of the symmetric spreading 
equilibrium. In particular, we will determine for which value of the free-ness of trade 
parameter φ  spreading of manufacturing production is no longer a stable equilibrium. 
First, we note that, since there is an equal provision of public goods in both regions, 
the welfare ratio for capital given in equation (13) simplifies to: 
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At the symmetric equilibrium 5.0=λ  we have 
(15) 
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Figure 1 Placed here 
 
Using this notation the break analysis consists of finding values of φ  for which 0'=ρ . 
As shown in appendix III for the real rental rate this implies solving equation (16). 
(16) 0
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Let φ  be the solution to equation (16) if there are no public goods provided, that is if 
0=Z  (see appendix III). We can determine the impact of the introduction of public 
goods on the break condition at the margin, that is, the solution evaluated at  0=Z , 
5.0=λ , and φφ = . Appendix III shows that at the margin the break condition for the 
free-ness of trade parameter falls if, and only if, condition (17) holds. 
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Proposition 4 (break point). Under assumption 1, the introduction of an equal 
provision of public goods in both regions at the margin reduces the free-ness of trade 
index for the break-point if, and only if, condition (17) holds. 
 
Figure 2 Placed here 
 
Proposition 4 is illustrated if condition (17) holds in Figure 1, showing that the break-
point is reached for a lower value of the free-ness of trade parameter φ if there are 
public goods )1.0( =Z  than in the absence of public goods )0( =Z . Since condition 
(17) is rather weak and holds for a wide range of parameter combinations ),( σδ , the 
introduction of public goods usually leads to a fall in the free-ness of trade break-
point, tending to reduce the stability of the spreading equilibrium, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. For Europe, for example, this suggests that incorporating the impact of the 
provision of public goods on the stability of the economic process, the process of 
continued economic integration (EU enlargement), which increases the free-ness of 
trade parameter φ , is more likely to lead to instability of the spreading equilibrium, or 
equivalently more likely to result in core-periphery outcomes. Figure 1 also illustrates 
why this is the case: h’3>0 and this indicates that the additional provision of public 
goods represents a negative externality as it reduces the number of available varieties, 
this implies that for lower values of the free-ness of trade index the incentive to move 
to a (marginal) larger region (more varieties) is reached sooner than without public 
goods. The next section illustrates our findings by showing a few simulation results. It 
shows (again) that the introduction of public goods stimulates agglomeration and that 
this is the case for all intermediate values of the free-ness of trade parameter φ . 
 
6. Simulation results 
Before we show some simulation examples we first have to address the following 
question: what is a reasonable choice for the tax rate to use in our simulations? We 
apply the following motivation to be able to answer this question. The government 
maximizes rt)1( − , taking into consideration that r  is a function of the tax rate t , and 
assumes that the change in remuneration is directly proportional to the change in 
capital productivity in the manufacturing sector (thus ignoring price index effects). 
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The first order condition implies that the government sets the income tax rate such 
that ffrrt /'/')1/(1 −==− . If we choose )exp()( ZZf η−= , we have η=− )1/(1 t ,  
which we use in the simulations below. 
 
Figure 3 Placed here  
 
First, Figure 3 illustrates for Z1=Z2 =0 (no public goods), that around the break-point 
the symmetric equilibrium is stable (the break point occurs at φ =0.359). Introducing 
public goods (squared line) in both countries (Z1=Z2=0.1) has a strong effect on the 
stability of the symmetric equilibrium in the sense that it becomes unstable. This 
simulation result is in line with the analytical results from the previous section. In 
section 5 we showed that for a broad range of parameter values, in particular for a 
broad range of σ and δ [see condition (17) and Figure 2], the introduction of public 
goods stimulates agglomeration by making the spreading equilibrium unstable at  a 
higher level of trade costs (lower values for φ ). It is only for a sufficiently low 
elasticity of substitution σ and a sufficiently high share of income spent on 
manufactures δ that this is not the case. To illustrate this, we ran the same simulation 
as in Figure 3, but now with σ=2 and δ=0.8 (not shown here), and just like Figure 2 
predicts the introduction of public goods now strengthens the stability of the 
spreading equilibrium.     
 
The analytical results derived in the previous section are based on the assumption that 
the 2 countries or regions are symmetric w.r.t. the provision of public goods: Z1=Z2. 
Figure 4 shows a simulation where we dropped this assumption. In Figure 4 we 
compare the situation where the provision of public goods in country 1 is the same as 
in country 2, Z1=0.05, and the situation when the provision of public goods is higher,  
Z2=0.07.   
 
Figure 4 Placed here 
 
If the 2 countries have the same level of public goods (dotted line) we end up with a 
stable symmetric equilibrium where both countries thus have the same share of capital 
of 0.5. For the case where Z1>Z2 (squared line), country 1 ends up with a higher share 
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of capital λ than country 2. The stable equilibrium now is one of partial 
agglomeration: λ1>λ2. This simulation result suggests that for countries to attract a 
larger share of the mobile production factor, they need to make sure that they provide 
more public goods. This is interesting because a relatively higher level of the 
provision of public goods is associated with higher tax levels. The positive effects of 
public goods dominate in this case.  
 
One might be tempted to conclude that tax competition would lead to a race-to-the-
top with respect to taxation and public expenditures, where in the end all of a 
country’s productive resources are directed towards the public goods sector. This is, 
however, not what our model predicts. A relatively higher level of public goods 
provision might be effective, as Figure 4 shows (in terms of attracting a more than a 
proportional share of capital),  but a country can easily push this argument too far. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5, which gives the simulation results for the case where 
country 1 spends far more on public goods than country 2, but more public goods may 
imply that country 1’s share of capital will be lower compared to the case with less 
public goods. In Figure 5, country 2 does not provide public goods at all (Z2=0) and, 
in line with Figure 4, a moderate level of public goods provision by country 1 
(Z1=0.1) makes country 1 better off to the extent that it ends up with more than its 
proportionate share of capital in equilibrium: λ1>0.5 (see dotted line). When, 
however, country 1 decides to increase the production of public goods, the resulting 
equilibrium is such that there is no longer partial agglomeration in favour of country 
1. Stronger still, its share of capital could even drop below 0.5 as Figure 5 illustrates 
for Z1=0.3 (squared line).  
 
As in all NEG models (partial) agglomeration is the result of the balance between 
spreading and agglomerating forces. In the present NEG model the production of 
public goods has negative effects that may outweigh the benefits of public goods. The 
relative welfare ρ for capital in country 1 is for instance negatively affected by an 
increased tax rate or the reduction of the number of varieties of the manufacturing 
good, both of which result when the level of public goods is increased. This important 
cautionary note as to the benefits of a relative increase in the level of public goods by, 
here, country 1 is reinforced if we would also allow for another asymmetry between 
the 2 countries, a country-specific efficiency of of public goods production 
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)exp()( ZZf ii η−= by making ηi country specific, see Brakman, Garretsen, and van 
Marrewijk (2002).     
 
Figure 5 Placed here 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
Recent advances in the theory of trade and location have shown that increasing 
economic integration does not need to lead to a race to the bottom with respect to 
taxation. This important result challenges the standard views about tax competition 
but the treatment of the government sector is still rather rudimentary. The emphasis is 
almost exclusively on taxes and its distribution consequences. This is rather one-sided 
because taxes are a means to an end and tax-financed public spending can also be 
used an instrument of locational competition. Countries try to increase their 
attractiveness as a location by investing in location-specific infrastructure. When the 
effects of agglomeration are thought to be important tax and spending policies 
represent two opposing forces. All other things remaining the same, higher taxes 
stimulate spreading even though the existence of an agglomeration rent may prevent 
the spreading from actually taking place. Similarly, an increase in public spending 
stimulates agglomeration if this spending enhances the attractiveness of the location 
for the mobile factors of production. But all things do not remain the same in the 
sense that higher taxes typically also imply higher public spending and vice versa.  
 
In the present paper we extend recent work in the new economic geography literature 
on tax competition by Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Andersson and Forslid 
(2003) in three ways. First, we allow for public spending to affect the cost of 
production and this has an impact on the location decisions of firms and workers. 
Second, we also take into account that the public sector has to compete with the 
private sector on the labor market so that public spending takes up net resources. 
Thirdly, in our analytics we focus on the symmetric equilibrium, as opposed to the 
agglomeration equilibrium, and on the impact of the provision of public goods on the 
symmetric equilibrium.  
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The main contribution of this paper is that it takes the interdependency between taxes 
and spending as a starting point. This means that by restricting locational competition 
to tax competition only, one neglects that the provision of public goods also 
determines (positively or negatively) the attractiveness of locations for footloose 
economic activity and thereby determines the equilibrium with respect to the 
distribution of footloose factors of production across space. Our conclusions are based 
on simulation results as well as analytical results. In general, the results indicate that, 
starting from an initial symmetric equilibrium, the introduction of public goods 
stimulates agglomeration and that, compared to the “no public goods” case, the 
symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable for lower degrees of economic integration 
(higher trade costs). Our simulations not only back up our analytical results, but by 
allowing for an asymmetric provision of public goods between the 2 countries, they 
additionally show that there’s a limit up to which an increase in public goods 
provision stimulates (partial) agglomeration.  
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Appendix I Derivation of equation (12) 
Using the income equations (8), equations (11) can be written as 
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and similarly for r2. Using the definitions of jh  and defining jψ  gives equation (14): 
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In the absence of a government sector, that is if 121 == ff  (such that 121 ==ψψ ) 
and λλ −== 1; 21 nn , this expression simplifies to the Forslid-Ottaviano model: 
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Appendix II Derivation of Table 4 
At the symmetric equilibrium we have: 5.0=λ ;  fff == 21 ; hhh == 21 ; 
nnn == 21 . Use this in appendix I to calculate the rental rate: 
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These results allow us to calculate the impact of changes of policy parameters on the 
endogenous variables of the model. The results are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Appendix III Derivation of equations (16) and (17) 
 The function 1h  transfers the pre-tax return to the post-tax return: 
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At the point of symmetry: ttt == 21 , 1)5.0(1 =Zh , and )5.0(')5.0(' 21 ZtZt −= , such 
that the derivative of 1h  simplifies to: )5.0(')]1/(2[)5.0(' 11 ZttZh −−= . We therefore 
have to determine the impact of a change in the distribution of capital on the tax rate. 
Since 1111 LKrY +=  and 111 YtZr =  in the symmetric equilibrium: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
1
1
11
1
11 2
)5.0('
)5.0('
Y
r
Yr
Zr
tZt   
Evaluating this expression at the margin at which no public goods are provided (such 
that the tax rate 01 =t ) shows that )05.0('1t  is identically 0, such that )05.0('1h  is 
identically 0 and at the margin the post-tax break-point analysis coincides with the 
pre-tax break-point analysis (note that this will simplify the break analysis below). 
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 The function 2h  gives the relative return on capital. Using assumption 1, the ratio 
of rewards to capital 21 / rr  is given in (12’). It is obvious that 1)5.0(2 =Zh . Taking 
the derivative of the function 2h  and evaluating it at the symmetric equilibrium gives: 
]2[
)(4)5.0(',
])1([
)2)(()('
321
21
22
321
32121
2 Zbbb
bbZh
Zbbb
ZbbbbbZh −+
−−=−−+
−+−−= λλλ  
 The function 3h  gives the relative price index effect in the utility function: 
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It is obvious that 1)5.0(3 =h . Taking the derivative of 3h  and evaluating it at the 
symmetric equilibrium gives: 
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 Combining the results above implies that the break condition is equation (16) in 
the text. If there are no public goods, that is if 0=Z  the solution for the free-ness of 
trade parameter, φ  say, that solves equation (16) is given by (see Forslid (1999), 
equation (13), or Forslid and Ottaviano (2001), equation (15)): 
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We can determine the impact of the introduction of public goods at the margin by 
differentiating condition (16) with respect to Z  and evaluating the result at 0=Z , 
5.0=λ , and φφ = :   
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It can be shown that, as a function of φ , equation (18) always cuts the horizontal axis 
from below if 1−<σδ , which corresponds to the standard no-black-hole condition.12 
The break point will be reached for a smaller value of the free-ness of trade index φ  if 
equation (A1) is positive, and for a larger value if equation (A1) is negative. This is 
illustrated in figure 1. Straightforward, but tedious, calculations show that equation 
(A1) is positive if, and only if condition (17) in the text holds. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1, Effective corporate income tax rates across the EU, % 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Austria 18 22 14 16 20 17 24 25 21 24 
Belgium 17 16 22 23 23 24 23 22 21 17 
Denmark 33 32 30 30 32 32 31 31 32 31 
Finland 45 37 34 24 26 27 28 28 28 28 
France 33 33 33 33 33 36 35 38 38 38 
Germany 48 49 49 44 41 41 41 40 40 41 
Greece 11 11 24 29 29 31 33 35 35 35 
Ireland 20 22 19 20 17 22 21 21 24 22 
Italy 38 41 47 50 44 46 45 43 44 40 
Netherlands 31 32 32 31 31 31 32 31 31 30 
Portugal 17 20 27 25 20 23 22 21 24 25 
Spain 27 28 29 27 25 24 26 26 26 29 
Sweden 31 32 30 19 28 27 28 28 28 28 
U.K. 33 31 31 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 
 
Average 28.7 29 30.2 27.7 28.4 29.3 29.9 29.8 30 29.8 
Weight. Av.* 35.5 36.1 37.3 35.3 34.1 35 35.1 34.8 34.9 34.6 
St. dev. 10.6 9.8 9.1 9.0 7.4 7.5 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.5 
Source: CPB, 2001a, Capital Income Taxation in Europe, Trends and Trade-offs, The Hague, p. 
27; data for Luxembourg not available; *weighted by a country’s GDP 
Table 2 General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 
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Table 2 General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Austria 13.4 13.8 15.2 17.8 18.5 19.6 18.9 20.4 19.2 18.7
Belgium 15.6 16.1 16.9 21.2 23 22.9 20.3 21.4 21.2 22.8
Denmark 13.6 17 20.9 25.3 27.3 25.9 25.6 25.8 25.3 26.5
Finland 12.2 14 14.8 17.5 18.4 20.6 21.6 22.8 20.6 22.1
France 16.7 16.9 17.3 19.5 21.5 23.7 22.3 23.9 23.2 24.3
Germany    21.7 21.7 21.3 19.7 19.8 19 19.3
Greece 10.1 10.1 10.9 12.8 13.5 16.6 15.1 15.3 15.7 15.5
Ireland 13.3 14.5 15.6 19.8 21.2 19.8 16.4 16.4 13.9 15.1*
Italy 14.3 17 15.5 16.5 16.9 18.6 20.2 17.9 18.3 19.5
Netherlands 16.3 18.8 19.9 23.8 25.3 24.3 23.5 24 22.7 24.5*
Portugal 9.8 11.1 12.8 13.9 13.5 14.4 16.2 18.6 20.5 21.1*
Spain 9.0 9.0 10.1 11.2 14 15.6 16.7 18.1 17.6 17.9
Sweden 16.4 18.3 22.2 24.6 29.8 27.9 27.4 27.2 26.6 28.3
UK 16.5 17.1 18 22.3 21.5 20.9 19.8 19.6 18.7 21.1
      
Average 13.6 14.9 16.2 19.1 20.4 20.9 20.3 20.8 20.2 21.2
St dev. 2.6 3.0 3.5 4.3 4.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.7
Min. 9.0 9.0 10.1 11.2 13.5 14.4 15.1 15.3 13.9 15.1
Max. 16.7 18.8 22.2 25.3 29.8 27.9 27.4 27.2 26.6 28.3
Source: World Bank CD-ROM 2005; * = data for 2002; sequential maximum for France, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Sweden, Denmark, and Sweden; sequential minimum for 
Spain, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Portugal,Greece, Ireland, and Greece. 
 
 
 
 27
 
Table 3 Preferred Locations in North-West Europe 
Regions: Attractive because:  
Niedersachsen (Germany) Close to Hannover. 
Nordrhein Westfalen (Germany) Enough space, good accessibility. 
Saarland (Germany) Near highways leading to Ruhrgebiet, Subsidies to 
start businesses, enough space, low land prices. 
Picardie (France) Near Paris (airport), good accessibility, low land 
prices. 
Champagne (France) Good infra-structure, always had a strong position 
(path-dependency). 
Netherlands Good accessibility, near airport (Schiphol), Good 
infra-structure (connections to Germany). 
Source: Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Location Patterns of leading companies in 
North-West Europe, 1999, p.36. 
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Table 4 Symmetric equilibrium 
 Impact of rise in 
Endogenous variable in  
symmetric equilibrium 
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Figure 2  Marginal impact of introducing public goods on break-point  
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Figure 3 Introduction of Public Goods around Breakpoint  
Choice of public goods around breakpoint; Z1 = Z2
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Parameter settings: ηi=1 (i=1,2); δ=0.6; σ=3; Zi=0.1 (default 0); Li=0.5: φ -break for Z=0 is 0.359   
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Figure 4 Asymmetric provision of public goods 
Choice of public goods, region 1; Z2 = 0.05
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Parameter settings: ηi=1 (i=1,2); δ=0.6; σ=4; φ =0.4; Z2=0.05; Z1=0.05 or 0.07; Li=0.5  
 
 
 33
Figure 5 Pushing the Public Goods Argument too Far…  
Choice of public goods, region 1; Z2 = 0
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Parameter settings: ηi=0.1 (i=1,2); δ=0.6; σ=4; φ =0.4; Z2=0; Z1=0.1 or 0.3; Li=0.5  
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1 Baldwin and Forslid (2002) is one of the first NEG papers to date that also deals 
with role of public goods alongside taxes. 
2 We do not address the difficult question about the most likely outcome of location-
competition between governments. In the absence of ideal market conditions 
international welfare maximization is not guaranteed (see Sinn, 2004). 
3 These 4 countries are also the core countries in the sense that their share in total EU 
manufacturing production is about 75%. This share remains fairly constant through 
the 1990s. 
4 Note that we do not claim that there is no tax competition at all in the EU. Sinn 
(2004), for instance, shows that the average tax burden for subsidiaries of US 
companies in the EU has decreased strongly in the various EU countries between 
1986 and 1992. 
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5 The data used in Devereux et al, 2002, do not cover not all EU countries, for the 
actual data set used in this study and various measures of the corporate income tax 
rates and tax revenues, see: 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210. 
6 To some extent, as shown below, the issue here is the difference between pure and 
pecuniary externalities. The former are absent in the standard geographical economics 
model.  
7 In the literature one finds various labels: skilled vs unskilled, human capital vs 
capital, labour vs capital. The precise label is not important for us as long one 
production factor is internationally mobile and the other is not. 
8 The main point here is to include a mobile and an immobile factor of production. 
The labelling of these two factors (unskilled versus skilled labor or labor versus 
capital) is not material as long as the mobile factor (be it skilled labor or capital) 
spends it income in the region where it is used for production;  see in particular 
Forslid (1999, p.11) for a discussion of the importance of this assumption. 
9 Differentiating between labor and capital income taxation raises the complication 
why to tax the mobile factor at all, see also Sinn (2004).  
10 The net effect on welfare cannot be discussed as a change in the elasticity of 
substitution affects the utility function itself. This also holds for a change in the share 
of income spent on manufactures. 
11 This expression readily simplifies to the Forslid-Ottaviano model if there are no 
public goods, see e.g. Ottaviano (2001), equation (10). 
12 This condition is somewhat less restrictive than the no-black hole condition in 
Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999). See also the appendix of Ottaviano (2001). 
